

# **Suspicious Transaction Reporting Guidelines**

## **Motor Vehicle Dealers**

## **1.0 INTRODUCTION**

In keeping with international obligations and ensuring that Zambia's financial institutions and other non-financial businesses and professions are not abused by persons involved in money laundering or the financing of terrorism, the Financial Intelligence Centre ( 'the Centre') was established to receive suspicious transaction reports from reporting entities, analyze and disseminate intelligence to law enforcement agencies (LEAs), pursuant to the Financial Intelligence Centre Act No 46 of 2010 ( 'the Act').

It is the responsibility of the Centre to issue guidelines to reporting entities to ensure reporting entities comply accordingly with the provisions of the Act. The purpose of these guidelines is to provide industry specific guidance for motor vehicle dealers on their legal obligations for measures to deter and detect money laundering and financing of terrorism activities and to assist motor vehicle dealers to comply with the Act.

These Suspicious Transaction Report (STRs) Guidelines have been issued in accordance with section 56 and pursuant to section 29 of the Act. One of the cardinal responsibilities of reporting entities is to submit a suspicious transaction report where there is suspicion that a transaction may arise from the commission of a crime or may be linked to the financing of terrorism.

### **1.1 Overview of the Motor Vehicles Sector**

The motor vehicles sector includes buying, selling and leasing of new and used vehicles. In Zambia, motor vehicle dealers are not licensed or regulated by a Supervisory Authority. In order to engage in the business of selling vehicles, it is sufficient for them to have the requisite registration from the Patents and Companies Registration Office and the Zambia Revenue Authority.

Under the FIC Act as amended in 2016, the Center is empowered to supervise sectors for Anti Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) where no specific supervisor is designated. In this regard, the Centre is the AML/CFT supervisory authority for Motor Vehicle dealers.

Motor vehicle dealers are an attraction to money launderers for many reasons. However, one common element of money laundering cases relating to vehicle dealers is the unreported use of cash to pay for the vehicles. Large amounts of dirty cash can be used to purchase luxurious vehicles without going through the regulated system. Criminals may use cash to buy high-value goods such as vehicles then travel to neighboring jurisdictions with them to transfer value while avoiding detection by financial institutions.

Laundering risks and ways laundering can occur through vehicle sellers include:

- i. Structuring cash deposits below the reporting threshold, or purchasing vehicles with sequentially numbered checks or money orders.
- ii. Trading in vehicles and conducting successive transactions of buying and selling new and used vehicles to produce complex layers of transactions.
- iii. Accepting third-party payments, particularly from jurisdictions with ineffective money laundering controls.

## 1.2 Scope of the Guidelines

The Motor Vehicle Dealers STR guidelines have incorporated essential elements of the Act, relevant FATF-Recommendations and other international best practices on AML/CFT regime. These guidelines cover among others the following key areas of AML/CFT policy; Customer due diligence, the AML/CFT Compliance programme; monitoring and responding to suspicious transactions.

The STR Guidelines are provided as general information only and as such do not represent all the requirements under the law. The guidelines do not constitute legal advice and are not intended to replace the Act or any other guidelines, directives or regulations issued by the Centre.

## 2.0 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

**Attempted Transaction:** Is one where a customer intended to conduct a transaction and took some form of action to do so. It is different from a simple request for information, such as an enquiry as to the price of a certain item. An attempted transaction includes entering into negotiations or discussions to conduct the transaction and involves concrete measures to be taken by either you or the customer.

**Financial Action Task Force (FATF):** Is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counterterrorist financing (CFT) standard.

**Money Laundering:** Under The Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act No 14 of 2001, as amended by Act No.44 of 2010, a money laundering offence involves various acts committed with the intention to conceal or convert property or the proceeds of property (e.g. money) knowing or believing that these were derived from the commission of a designated offence. In this context, a designated offence means a serious offence as defined in the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act, 2010. It includes among others those relating to illegal drug trafficking, corruption, bribery, fraud, forgery,

murder, robbery, counterfeit money, stock manipulation. A money laundering offence may also extend to property or proceeds derived from illegal activities that took place outside Zambia.

**Politically exposed Persons (PEPs):** Are individuals who have or had been entrusted with prominent public functions both in Zambia and foreign countries and those associated with them.

**Reporting Entity:** An institution regulated by a Supervisory Authority and required to make a suspicious transaction report to the Centre on suspected Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and other serious offences under the Act. In accordance with Section 2 of the Act, Motor Vehicle Dealers are designated as Reporting Entities.

**Terrorist Financing:** Terrorist financing offences extend to any person who willfully provides or collects funds by any means, directly or indirectly, with the unlawful intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used in full or in part to carry out a terrorist act by a terrorist organization or an individual terrorist. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act No. 21 of 2007 (as amended), it is an offence to knowingly collect or provide property, such as funds, either directly or indirectly, to carry out terrorism or terrorist financing activities.

### **3.0 CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE**

Customer Due Diligence (CDD) is the identification and verification of both the customer and beneficiary including but not limited to continuous monitoring of the business relationship with the reporting entity.

Part III of the Act requires reporting entities to institute measures to ensure effective CDD at all times. Reporting Entities shall undertake measures when:

- i. Establishing a business relationship with or conducting a business transaction for a customer
- ii. Carrying out a transaction in an amount equal to, or above such amount as may be prescribed including where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or several operations that appear to be linked.
- iii. The Customer wishes to carry out a domestic or international wire transfer of monetary amounts in the amounts equal to, or above, the prescribed amount
- iv. There is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing
- v. There are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.

### **3.1 Customer Due Diligence Procedures**

a. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall identify their customers (whether permanent or occasional; natural or legal persons; or legal arrangements) and verify the customers' identities using reliable, independently sourced documents, such as a validly issued National Registration Card, Passport, Drivers' Licence, (which should not have expired at the time of conducting CDD), Certified Certificate of Incorporation or such other information as the Minister may prescribe.

b. In respect of customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements, reporting entities shall:

i. verify any person purporting to have been authorised to act on behalf of such a customer by obtaining evidence of his/her identity and verifying the identity of such a person; and

ii. Verify the legal status of the legal person or legal arrangement by obtaining proof of incorporation from a recognised established body or similar evidence of establishment or existence and any other relevant information.

c. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall identify a beneficial-owner and take reasonable measures to verify his/her identity using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source to satisfy themselves that they know who the beneficial-owner is.

d. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall in respect of all customers determine whether or not a customer is acting on behalf of another person. Where the customer is acting on behalf of another person, the reporting entity shall take reasonable steps to obtain sufficient identification-data and to verify the identity of that other person.

e. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall take reasonable measures in respect of customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements to:

i. Understand the ownership and control structure of such a customer; and

ii. Determine the natural persons that ultimately own or control the customer. For trusts – The natural persons are the settlor, the trustee and person exercising effective control over the trust and the beneficiaries.

f. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship of their potential customers.

g. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship as stated by the customers above.

h. The ongoing due diligence above includes scrutinizing the transactions undertaken by the customer throughout the course of the relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the reporting entities' knowledge of the customer, its business and risk profiles, and the source of funds (where necessary).

i. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall ensure that documents, data or information collected under the CDD-process are kept up-to-date and relevant by undertaking reviews of existing records, particularly the records in respect of higher-risk business relationships or customer categories. All books and records with respect to its customers and transactions should be maintained for a period of at least 10 years;

### **3.2 High-Risk Categories of Customers**

Motor Vehicle Dealers should have appropriate risk management systems to identify customers whose activities may pose a high risk of money laundering and financing terrorism. To this effect, they are required to exercise enhanced identification, verification and ongoing due diligence procedures with respect to High Risk Customers. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall perform enhanced due diligence for high-risk categories of customers, business relationships or transactions. Examples of high-risk customer categories include:

- a. Companies that have nominee-shareholders or shares in bearer form;
- b. Non-resident customers;
- c. Legal persons or legal arrangements such as trusts that are personal-assets holding vehicles;
- d. Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).

Reporting Entities shall, in addition to performing CDD procedures, put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a potential customer or existing customer or the beneficial-owner is a PEP.

The risk management systems used by reporting entities to identify customers whose activities may pose a high risk of money laundering and financing of terrorism shall require:-

l. Enhanced identification-which involves identifying customers or activities engaged in by customers who may pose high risk of money laundering or financing of terrorism by taking into account:

- a. the nature and business of customers;

- b. customer activities, transaction patterns and operations;
- c. geographic location of the customer and/or transaction
- d. the magnitude of customer assets that a reporting entity handles;
- e. third parties that may be involved in the customer's activities;
- f. the beneficial ownership of an entity and their impact on risk;
- g. volume of cash used by customer in their transactions; and
- h. any other indicators that may be relevant.

II. Verification and on-going Due Diligence-which includes:

- a. Seeking additional information beyond the minimum requirements under the law to substantiate the customer's identity or the beneficial ownership of an entity and
- b. Obtaining additional information about the intended nature and value of a given transaction.

Motor Vehicle Dealers shall obtain senior management approval before they establish a business relationship with a PEP. Where a customer has been accepted or has an ongoing relationship with your company and the customer or beneficial-owner is subsequently found to be or becomes a PEP, a Motor Vehicle Dealer is required to obtain senior management approval in order to continue the business relationship. Motor Vehicle Dealers shall take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and the sources of funds of customers and beneficial-owners identified as PEPs and report all anomalies or unusual and abnormal transactions immediately to the Centre. As Motor Vehicle Dealers, if you are in business relationships with PEPs, you are required to conduct enhanced on-going monitoring of that relationship.

#### **4.0 THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING (AML) AND COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (CFT) COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME**

An AML/CFT programme is an essential component of a reporting entity's compliance regime. The AML/CFT compliance programme should be risk-based, and should be designed to mitigate the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing risks the reporting entity may encounter.

##### **4.1. Elements of an AML/CFT Programme**

#### 4.1.1 A system of internal policies, procedures and controls

Motor Vehicle Dealers shall adopt policies indicating their commitment to comply with AML/CFT obligations under the relevant Acts and regulations to prevent any transaction that facilitates ML/TF activities. Every Motor Vehicle Dealer shall formulate and implement internal rules procedures and other controls that will deter criminals from using its facilities for money laundering and terrorist financing and to ensure that its obligations under the relevant laws and regulations are always met. These procedures, policies and controls should cover the CDD, record retention, the detection of unusual and suspicious transactions, the reporting obligation, among other things.

#### 4.1.2 Compliance Officer

Motor Vehicle Dealer should designate a Compliance Officer within its organisation who shall receive suspicious or unusual transaction reports from persons handling transactions within the entity. The Compliance Officer designated should be approved by the Financial Intelligence Centre. The Compliance Officer shall be equipped with the relevant competence, authority and independence to implement the institution's AML/CFT compliance programme. The Compliance Officer shall have ready access to all the books, records and employees of the reporting entity necessary to fulfil the responsibilities under the Act.

An employee of a reporting entity shall promptly report to a designated Compliance Officer all cases where: a) the employee becomes aware, has knowledge or suspects or has reasonable grounds to believe, that a customer has been or is involved in an illegal activity or crime; or b) a customer in respect of whom the employee becomes aware, has knowledge or suspects or has reasonable grounds to believe, that another customer has been engaging in illegal activities or crimes.

The duties of the Compliance Officer shall include but shall not be limited to the following:

- i. Developing an AML/CFT Compliance Programme;
- ii. Receiving and vetting suspicious transaction reports from staff;
- iii. Filing suspicious transaction reports with the Centre;
- iv. Ensuring that the reporting entities' compliance programme is implemented;
- v. Co-ordinating the training of staff in AML/CFT awareness, detection methods and reporting requirements; and
- vi. Serving both as a liaison officer with the Centre as well as a point-of-contact for all employees on issues relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. Every reporting entity shall ensure that the Compliance Officer has access to other information that may be of assistance to the anti-money

laundering reporting officer in consideration of a suspicious or unusual transaction.

A Motor Vehicle Dealer shall cooperate with the Law enforcement Agencies to facilitate the exchange of information relating to money laundering and terrorist financing.

#### **4.1.3 Training**

The Act requires reporting entities to have formal, written AML/CFT Compliance programmes that include training. Ongoing employee training programs should be in place in all reporting entities to ensure that employees are kept informed of new developments, including information on current ML and FT techniques, methods and trends; and that there is a clear explanation of all aspects of AML/CFT laws and obligations, and in particular, requirements concerning CDD and suspicious transaction reporting. The timing, coverage and content of the employee training program should be tailored to meet the perceived needs of the reporting entity.

#### **4.1.4 Independent Audit**

Putting your AML/CFT Compliance programme in place is not enough. The programme must be monitored and evaluated.

Therefore, Motor Vehicle Dealers are supposed to have an independent audit performed by people not involved with the entity's AML/CFT Compliance staff to test compliance with the procedures, policies and controls. The individuals conducting the audit should report directly to the board of directors or to a designated board committee composed primarily or completely of outside directors.

#### **Monitoring of AML/CFT Compliance programme**

The Financial Intelligence Centre will from time to time undertake on and off-site visits to reporting entities to monitor how the AML/CFT Compliance programmes are being implemented.

#### **I. Obligation to Report Suspicious Transaction**

Whenever a Motor Vehicle Dealer processes a transaction to which there is reasonable grounds to suspect that any property is the proceeds of crime, or is related to, or is to be used for, terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations or persons who finance terrorism, it should take reasonable measures to ascertain the purpose of that transaction and submit a report to the Centre, setting out the suspicion, within three (3) working days of forming that suspicion.

Further, a reporting entity is required to exercise caution when carrying out a transaction which it suspects to be related to money laundering or financing of terrorism. The Act also requires an STR to be submitted on attempted money laundering or financing of terrorism.

Failure to submit a suspicious transaction report to the Centre may lead to imprisonment upon conviction to a term of up to seven years or payment of a fine of seven hundred thousand penalty units or to both.

## **II. Prohibition against Tipping Off**

A reporting entity or any director, partner, officer, principal or employee of the reporting entity is not allowed to disclose to any person the contents of the STR Form. Further, the disclosure of any other information from which a person could reasonably be expected to conclude that a suspicion has been formed or that a report has been or may be made is prohibited.

Any person who contravenes this requirement commits an offence and is liable to a fine of up to five hundred thousand penalty units or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both.

## **III. Protection of identity of persons and information relating to STRs**

A reporting entity is not allowed to disclose any information that identifies, or is likely to identify the person who prepared or made a suspicious transaction report, or handled the underlying transaction. In light of the foregoing, the disclosure of identity of the above mentioned person is confidential. Section 47 of the Act prohibits the disclosure of confidential information. Such disclosure is an offence which may result in a fine of up to five hundred thousand penalty units or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both.

## **IV. Protection of entities/persons reporting**

No civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings for breach of banking or professional secrecy or contract shall be taken against you for submitting a completed STR Form, in good faith, or in compliance with directions given by the Act.

## **5.0 HOW TO IDENTIFY A SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION IN THE MOTOR VEHICLES SECTOR**

Where there is a business relationship, a suspicious transaction will often be one which is inconsistent with your customer's known, legitimate or personal activities or with their normal business. Therefore, the first key to recognition is knowing enough about your customer and customer's business, to recognize that a transaction or series of transactions are unusual.

Reliance on what should be reported is largely on one's assessment, based on knowledge and experience, as well as specific circumstances of the transaction. The assessment should therefore be based on a reasonable evaluation of relevant factors, including the knowledge of the clients business, financial history, background and behavior.

### **5.1. Specific Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing Indicators in the Motor Vehicles Sector**

As entities and personnel working in the motor vehicles sector, there is need to note that there are a number of indicators which may assist in the identification of potential money laundering or terrorism financing activities. Although the existence of a single indicator does not necessarily indicate illicit activity, it should encourage further monitoring and examination.

In most cases, it is the existence of multiple indicators which raises a reporting entity's suspicion of potential criminal activity, and informs their response to the situation. Directors and Senior Management should include these money laundering/terrorism financing indicators in staff training and encourage their staff to use these indicators when describing suspicious behaviours for inclusion in suspicious matter reports submitted to the Centre.

#### **ML/TF indicators for the Motor Vehicles Sector**

The list below features some of the major indicators of money laundering and terrorist financing in the Motor Vehicles Sector and should be treated as a non exhaustive guide:

- i. Customer attempts to purchase vehicle with a significant amount of cash.
- ii. Customer is reluctant or refuses to produce personal identification documents for the transaction to be completed.
- iii. Customer pays substantial down payment in cash and balance is financed by an unusual source for example a third party or private lender.
- iv. Purchases carried out on behalf of persons who appear to lack the economic capacity to make such purchases.
- v. Last minute cancellation of order, which means that funds would have to be reimbursed to the customer via a business cheque.
- vi. Customer purchases vehicle without inspecting it.
- vii. Customer purchases multiple vehicles in a short time period, and seems to have few concerns about the type, cost, condition, etc.
- viii. Customer is known to have a criminal background.
- ix. Customer uses or produces identification documents with different names.
- x. Customer does not want to put his/her name on any document that would connect him/ her with the purchase of the vehicle.

- xi. Purchase appears to be beyond the means of the customer based on his/her stated or known occupation or income.

## **6.0 HOW TO OBTAIN SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION FORMS**

You may obtain the STR forms by contacting the FIC office using the address provided under paragraph nine (9) of this document or emailing [ficstr@fic.gov.zm](mailto:ficstr@fic.gov.zm). Further, an electronic copy of the STR form can be accessed on the FIC website ([www.fic.gov.zm](http://www.fic.gov.zm)).

## **7.0 HOW TO COMPLETE A SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT**

When completing an STR form, you **MUST** follow the instructions contained in the form and ensure that mandatory fields are duly completed.

## **8.0 HOW TO SEND YOUR SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTS TO FIC**

The completed STR form by confidential cover, must be reported through the following means:

- i. On the FIC e-system (applicable only to reporting institutions with electronic link with the FIC);
- ii. Authenticated FIC email address provided for under six (6) of this document;
- iii. To be hand delivered to designated officials of the Monitoring and Analysis Department of the Centre premises.

## **9.0 FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE CONTACT DETAILS**

All the completed reports or any queries should be sent to:

The Director General

Financial Intelligence Centre

Plot 50 L, Kudu Road, Kabulonga

P O Box 30481

Lusaka

ZAMBIA